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Discussing Corporate Misbehavior  
THE CONFLICTING NORMS OF MARKET, AGENCY, 
PROFIT AND LOYALTY* 
Daniel J. H. Greenwood† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Corporate law remains thin, but corporate law 
scholarship is thickening. This Symposium is both a symbol of 
and a major contribution to that process. We are stepping 
beyond the narrow models of rationally maximizing fictional 
shareholders and purely self-interested managers competing in 
an evolutionarily determined and purely individualistic market 
inevitably maximizing social wealth through the pursuit of 
private profit. Instead, new scholarship is taking a richer 
perspective infused with the insights of group and individual 
psychology, recognitions of institutional realities, and broader 
conceptions of the social good.  
American corporate law restricts itself to a limited view 
of the public corporation. In state corporate law, a corporation 
consists of little more than directors and shares,1 with the 
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 1 I use the term “share” rather than the more common “shareholder” because 
corporate law and scholarship alike normally ignore the portfolios and people who own 
the shares (i.e., the shareholders), instead focusing on a purely imaginary creature 
with no views, interests or desires other than maximizing the value of the particular 
corporate stock at issue. In corporate law, then, the term “shareholder” while 
misleadingly invoking images of a human being, actually refers only to a role. See 
generally Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: “For Whom is the 
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occasional cameo appearance of creditors of a firm near 
bankruptcy, or managers as the secret doppelgangers of the 
inside directors. The issues of central concern to the law are 
similarly restricted: the formal voting rights of shares, the 
ultimate power of the directors to manage the corporation and 
the limited exception granted to shares to sue derivatively, the 
directors’ limited fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
shares, and some cameo appearances of other legal values 
when shares and directors are at odds over takeovers. Even in 
these areas, corporate law is famously “enabling,” “towering 
skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and 
containing nothing but wind.”2  
When corporate law has entered the normative thicket, 
it has usually been to enforce the thin view of its purposes: to 
define shareholder interests as the interests of the role, rather 
than the human beings who inhabit it, and to force managers 
to restrict their view of the corporation’s interests to those of 
these legally constructed fictional shareholders.3 ERISA and 
the fiduciary and agency rules regulating the decision-makers 
for most institutional shareholders (that is, the holders of most 
shares), often require them to act as if their only concern were 
maximizing returns to undiversified shareholding in the 
particular corporation. Moreover, corporate law gives directors 
and shares the right to sell corporate control without consent of 
other corporate constituencies. Combined with the anonymous 
market for publicly traded stock, this creates vast market 
pressure to run the firm in the manner most likely to be 
rewarded by the stock market. And (at least since the demise of 
the conglomerate fad of the 1960s) the stock market has 
generally bid up the stock prices of corporations that 
  
Corporation Managed,” Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996). Moreover, voting in a 
corporation is on the basis of one share one vote, rather than one shareholder one vote; 
here too the term “shareholder” tends to mislead, giving the appearance of democracy 
where there is at best plutocracy.  
 2 Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for 
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962). 
 3 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (declaring that the 
purpose of the corporation is to earn returns for its shares, regardless of the expressed 
views of the majority shareholder); State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc. 191 N.W. 
2d 406 (Minn. 1971) (declaring illegitimate attempt of shareholder to cause corporation 
to consider values other than profit-maximization); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) (requiring managers, under limited 
circumstances, to pretend that shareholders have no interests other than the value of 
their shares, and to run the corporation in those legally defined interests). More often, 
however, corporate law’s business judgment rule removes the issue of corporate 
purpose from judicial purview.  
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demonstrate a decent respect for the opinions of institutional 
shareholders and show a keen focus on identifying corporate 
interests with stock market interests.  
Other areas of the law regulate other aspects of the 
public corporation, but generally without consideration of the 
specific characteristics of corporations as such. Thus, securities 
law, in general, protects securities holders as outsiders, 
consumers of a product produced by the corporation, creating 
rights to information in the manner of a truth-in-packaging 
law.4 Environmental law, constitutional law, criminal law, 
labor law and so on, generally regulate the corporation as a 
“person,” ignoring its collective and corporate character and 
subjecting it to norms created for citizens without much 
consideration of special issues of organizational behavior.5  
But public corporations are not individuals. They are 
large bureaucratic organizations, no more likely to respect 
individual rights or needs than the large bureaucratic 
organizations of the state, and generally a good deal less 
responsive to the views of the majority or those they affect. 
General American law starts from a basic distinction between 
state and citizen, public and private—but we have placed our 
large public business corporations on the private, citizen side of 
the divide, as if we needed rights for them rather than rights 
against them, or as if we existed for their sake rather than they 
for ours. Since the fundamental foundation of the individualist 
liberal political theory on which our polity is based is the 
recognition that groups and organizations often do not act as 
the individuals in them would like them to, this conflation of 
corporations with people is strange, to say the least.  
  
 4 Even the Williams Act, which edges into regulation of the firm’s internal 
decision-making processes while retaining the form of consumer protection by 
disclosure regulation, strikingly avoids substantive discussion of how, by and for whom 
corporations are run. 
 5 The corporate income tax scheme also treats the corporation as a person or 
entity, taxing the corporation’s income just as it taxes any other person’s income. The 
current attack on so-called “double taxation” however, seems to be premised on the 
claim that the corporation can be reduced completely to its shareholders, so that its 
income is theirs even though they have no right to receive or control it. This revisionist 
view rejects both the person/entity view most commonly seen in regulatory statutes in 
favor of corporate law’s currently dominant view of the firm as a “moment in the 
market” with no institutional existence. As should be apparent, neither of these views 
are compatible with a perspective that takes the institutional reality of the firm 
seriously. A serious discussion of taxation of public corporations would have to begin by 
discarding rhetorical claims that the corporation is a person like any other or doesn’t 
exist and instead to confront the near impossibility of determining the actual impact of 
corporate income tax on corporate participants in increased prices or reduced payments 
(salary, dividend, interest or prices).  
 5/5/2005 11:46:45 AM 
1216 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:4 
Corporate law scholarship in the last quarter of the 
millennium both celebrated the limited protection the law 
offers and narrowed the scope of its own concerns even further.  
Its psychological theory began, and usually ended, with 
a model of rational profit maximizers borrowed from neo-
classical economics. Shareholders were modeled as one-sided 
fictions with no interests or values other than increasing the 
value of the stock they hold in a single corporation—as if they 
were undiversified aliens or colonial occupiers with no interest 
in the society they sought to exploit. Directors and managers 
were reduced to self-interested cynics who must be coerced or 
paid obscene amounts to do their jobs or observe minimal 
professional norms. Other employees simply disappeared from 
view altogether, except perhaps as tools to be maximally 
exploited. 
Its normative concerns sometimes seemed restricted to 
no more than a debate between advocates of idolatry—viewing 
every idiosyncrasy of legally regulated markets as sacred—and 
plutocracy—seeking to ensure, market or no, that an ever 
increasing slice of the corporate pie was served to the capital 
markets.  
Sociologically, in the leading models, the firm itself 
seemed at times to lose its corporeality, as “nexus of contracts” 
models made the institution invisible, no more than a collection 
of individuals meeting in a collection of moments to exchange 
and then depart again into the “woods of America . . . perfectly 
in a state of nature.”6  
In the last decade, however, we have moved into a new 
era. Corporate law scholars have begun to recognize that we 
must take into account the learning of real psychology, that we 
must understand group interactions outside the narrow bounds 
of neo-classical individualism, that the organization has 
  
 6 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 295 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) (1690). Locke here follows Thomas Hobbes’ description of 
the state of mutual disinterestedness—war—between individuals in America and 
anywhere else “where there were no common Power to feare.” THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN 65 (Prometheus 1988) (1651) . Hobbes’ portrait of man in the state of 
nature is closely related to the usual models of motivation used in classic late twentieth 
century corporate law. As he describes it, in the absence of relationship or government: 
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that 
nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice 
have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: 
where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall 
vertues.  
Id. at 66  
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behaviors and meanings that can no more be reduced to the 
individuals in it than government can be reduced to the 
governed, that ethical issues may be more complex than simply 
not stealing from shareholders (and stealing as much as 
possible for them). 
The essay proceeds as follows. Part II uses Professor 
Linda Treviño’s contribution to this Symposium, which details 
the important ways in which a corporate CEO influences the 
rule-abidingness of his subordinates, as a reminder that 
corporate law must consider the sociological institution of the 
firm, not merely the limited roles which we usually emphasize. 
Part III explores Professor John Darley’s contention that 
people in firms seem unduly “recruitable into corrupt practices” 
and discusses how people in corporate roles often seem to 
conclude that the right thing is the wrong thing to do. Part IV 
takes the idea of role based norms one step further: The 
corporation, I contend, functions at the intersection of radically 
different market and fiduciary norms and is inherently a locus 
of normative conflict. Thus, corporate wrongdoing is as likely to 
result from the wrong norm in the wrong place (including but 
not limited to the team spirit, internal culture and loyalty that 
Professors Treviño and Darley discuss) as from selfishness, 
corruption or other forms of explicitly bad behavior. Part V 
discusses the ways in which corporations can mediate these 
normatively conflicts, successfully or not. Part VI concludes 
with some preliminary suggestions for further research and 
law reform.  
II.  THE ROLE OF THE CEO 
Professor Treviño and others have demonstrated that 
CEO behavior critically affects firm ethics. When the CEO acts 
ethically and creates institutional structures that make clear to 
other employees that the firm values ethical behavior, the firm 
acts more ethically.  
Over the course of the last three decades, CEO pay has 
risen astronomically in the United States, from perhaps 24 
times the average employee’s pay in 1965 to 300 times by the 
turn of the century.7 With our CEOs now paid so much more 
  
 7 LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2004/2005, at 
212-216 & figure 2Y. See also Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and Four 
Hundred for C: The Widening Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File 
Workers, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115, 116 n.4 (2002) (stating that in 2000, average 
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than the rest of us (and even than comparable CEOs in other 
countries8), a cottage industry has sprung up defending the 
high compensation. Institutional shareholders were persuaded 
by agency theory arguments that high, stock-based pay for 
CEOs would cause higher CEO productivity: By tying CEO 
incentives to share price performance, high pay would lessen 
CEO shirking, thereby increasing returns for shares.9 After the 
pay increases, the standard neo-classical model of wage setting 
for employees provided an equal and opposite justification: A 
profit-maximizing company would hire someone only if their 
pay is lower than their contribution to the firm’s profit. On the 
“best of all possible worlds” view of this perfect market theory, 
it seems to follow that high CEO pay must result from high 
CEO productivity. Combined, the theories contend that 
American CEOs are paid more than their foreign counterparts 
and their predecessors because they are doing a better job.10  
But with high compensation should come high 
responsibility. All that pay must be for something. It has been 
  
CEO compensation was 531 times the pay of the average blue collar worker). Another 
way to see the same phenomenon is that average hourly wages were up 10% in real 
terms between 1989 and 2000, while average CEO compensation increased 342% in 
that period. MISHEL, supra, at 113 tbl. 2.1, 213 tbl. 2.46. 
  American CEO pay is almost as unequal as American income generally. 
Accordingly, average CEO compensation is vastly higher than median CEO 
compensation (in 2000, $11.194 million vs. $3.101 million). MISHEL, supra, at 213. 
Median CEO compensation of $3.6 million in 2003 was 336 times the $10,712 a full 
time worker would earn at minimum wage ($5.15/hr, 8 hours/day, 260 days/year) and 
101 times average 2002 wages of $35,424. MISHEL, supra, at 113. 
 8 Stabile, supra note 7, at 121 n.22; MISHEL, supra note 7, at 214, 215 tbl. 
2.47 (stating that US CEOs are paid roughly three times as much as their counterparts 
in other developed countries). 
 9 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives— It’s Not 
How Much You Pay, But How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990). Agency theory 
suggested that tying CEO pay to stock performance would make CEOs more 
entrepreneurial. In my view, the changes in CEO pay probably did increase 
shareholder gains, but the incentive theory seems unduly mechanical. Instead, high 
pay alone, as well as vastly increased stock holdings, has changed CEO views of the 
team for which they play. The modern CEO is far less likely to identify with the 
bureaucracy he heads and far more likely to identify with his peers heading other 
corporations. Moreover, as CEOs become increasingly wealthy and increasingly large 
stockholders (both in their own company and the market generally), they are less likely 
to think of themselves as professionals and more likely to think as investors or owners. 
These reorientations make it less likely for CEOs to identify the interest of the firm 
with the interest of its employees. They, however, also make it more likely for CEOs to 
view their role inside the firm cynically and, in some instances, to abandon team 
playing altogether. For further discussion, see Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis, 2004 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 773, 802 (2004).  
 10 See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (2004) (noting that US executives are paid more than 
their foreign counterparts and explaining it as reflecting greater productivity).  
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startling, then, to see the alacrity with which the CEOs on the 
“perp walk” (as Professor Treviño terms it) have adopted a 
defense based on ignorance. Apparently, we are supposed to 
believe that CEOs earn their enormous compensation through 
their ability to make the organization more productive, while 
simultaneously accepting that they really have no idea what is 
going on in their organization, even at the basic level of 
whether the organization is actually producing or just faking it. 
On this view, ignorance is a defense, even for those whose 
business is knowledge. As in My Lai or Abu Ghraib, the upper 
echelons deny any connection to crimes committed by their 
underlings: Those designing institutions insist that they should 
be entitled to assume that those below them will act 
appropriately in all circumstances regardless of institutional 
pressures, temptations or norms.11 
Professor Treviño shows that, at least in the corporate 
world, we should just say no. Whether CEOs like it or not (and 
whether or not it fits into the thin theories of corporate 
behavior based on rational maximization), institutional ethics 
are largely under CEO control. CEO behavior matters. CEO 
talk matters. CEO silence matters. Organizational structures 
implemented by CEOs matter.  
Professor Treviño maintains that most corporate actors 
are not fully autonomous rule-following ethicists unaffected by 
the norms and expectations of those around them. Instead, like 
most adults, they tend to conform their behavior to the norms 
they believe are expected of them. Since CEOs are 
instrumental in creating those expectations and the 
institutions that back them up, they are instrumental in 
determining how employees will behave.  
  
 11 For a recent corporate law discussion of this issue, see In re Caremark 
International, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 970-71 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
Caremark limited the old Delaware rule, set out in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co, 
188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963), that “absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon 
the directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out 
wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists,” Graham, 188 A.2d at 130, 
holding that directors have a “duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate 
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists” In re 
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970, and that liability may be found if directors “utter[ly] fail[] 
to attempt to assure” such a system exists. Id. at 971 By focusing on “information and 
reporting,” id., Caremark continues to operate on a background assumption that 
wrongdoing occurs independent of corporate structure or internal corporate norms. 
Note however that Caremark involves board liability. Boards might reasonably be 
expected to have less responsibility for the firm’s behavior than CEOs, who unlike 
directors are full-time employees of the firm with primary responsibility for creating 
and operating its structures.  
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Corporate law generally treats corporate ethics as 
outside of its scope, as if the structures created and regulated 
by corporate law had no significant influence on ethical 
behavior or as if those structures were outside the realm of 
corporate law. Companies and their employees may follow the 
rules or they may not. For corporate law (like criminal law), the 
firm is black box. These areas of the law look just to the 
results—if things do not work out, the firm will not be 
competitive or the regulators will stop it. But Professor 
Treviño’s work, like the other work presented at this 
Symposium, suggests that we needn’t be so agnostic. We know 
how to influence the degree of corporate ethical behavior, and 
we could mandate better processes than the ones we allow.  
III.  CORPORATIONS COMPOSED OF SHARES VS. 
CORPORATIONS COMPOSED OF PEOPLE 
Corporate law, in my view, generally regards the 
corporation as a commonwealth of dollars. Shares, each 
representing an equal equity investment in the firm, are the 
citizens of this polity; it is they and they alone who are granted 
the political right to vote, entitled to demand equality, or 
barred from immigration and emigration without consent of 
the whole. Shares and shares alone are given the right to 
invoke the assistance of the law to insist that the firm consider 
their interests; in extreme versions of corporate law ideology 
(and in Revlon mode12 as a matter of corporate law) only the 
interests of shares ought to be considered.  
In this picture, even the shareholders, in their full 
humanity as pensioners, employees, CEOs or progeny of the 
robber baron elite, citizens or aliens, parents and children, and 
holders of various religious, ethical or aesthetic values, 
ultimately disappear. The people who are the corporation in 
the ordinary course—employees—never appear in the first 
place. They are the concern of some other area of law.  
When corporations go bad, however, the firm itself 
comes back into focus, not as a evanescent nexus of contracts or 
as a commonwealth of shares, but as a sociological entity—a 
group of people—with actions and values that cannot be 
reduced to those of its component parts.  
  
 12 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 
(Del. 1985) (creating duty to maximize share value in narrow circumstances, when the 
company’s sale has become inevitable).  
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This is where Professor Darley starts: From the firm as 
a group of people working together, not a pot of money 
managed on behalf of its “owners.” His puzzle is that people in 
firms seem “more recruitable into corrupt practices” than one 
would anticipate. His explanation is a combination of 
normative drift, group loyalty and social roles that value 
“playing rough.”  
The normative drift argument is a variant on the 
famous claim that a frog won’t jump out of a pot if you heat it 
gently enough. Because it can only identify incremental change 
rather than absolute states, it feels perfectly comfortable until 
it cooks. Here, the argument is that many scandals begin with 
a small deviation and proceed in small increments, so that at 
each point the participants can see the next step as merely an 
insignificant addition to a commitment already made. They 
start out with the typical lawyer’s rationalization—if “x” is 
permissible, then “almost x” must also be, since the two are so 
close as to be indistinguishable. By the point this 
rationalization no longer works, participants shift to the 
criminal’s commitment: I’m in so deep already that a little 
more won’t hurt.  
This story is important, especially for law students, 
since it is often the lawyer’s role to turn the heat up gently by 
pressing the interpretative limits of regulatory norms—but 
also to remember that when you press far enough, even in 
increments that are each justifiable, you generally end up 
cooked. Too many clever arguments without enough grounding 
in extra-professional norms ultimately lead to scandal, 
corporate collapse or even jail. 
But it is on the latter explanations that I want to focus 
here. Here, Professor Darley is telling us not about people who 
have lost their normative way but about specific choices that 
seem correct to them, but wrong to more detached observers. 
Sometimes, as he points out, they are even consciously 
understood as moral dilemmas, not invisible at all, but great 
and traumatic, in which the employee must choose between 
loyalties. Then, corporate criminality partakes of classic 
tragedy. Pity the person who must choose between friend and 
country; only doom can result.  
IV. THE CORPORATION’S CONFLICTING NORMS 
As a lawyer rather than a social psychologist or student 
of management, my own concerns are centrally normative.  
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Corporations exist on the border between two conflicting 
sets of norms, and the issues raised by this Symposium can be 
seen as resulting from the conflicts between those norms. The 
problem, or at least part of it, is not violation of norms so much 
as their inappropriate application, following the right norm at 
the wrong time or in the wrong place. The normative conflict is 
irresolvable, but by highlighting it we can work towards a 
better mediation of our contradictory normative intuitions. 
Conventional corporate law scholarship, however, has largely 
concealed the conflict.  
On the one hand, we have the market, governed by 
contract law. The basic norms are of John Locke’s state of 
nature and Adam Smith’s market: disinterested strangers 
treating each other as means to their own ends, not as Kantian 
ends in themselves.13 The principles of loving your neighbor—or 
even your child—as yourself are out of place here; a 
marketplace can’t function if the bargaining parties view their 
opposites as parts of themselves. This is the world of every man 
for himself, not one for all and all for one.  
To be sure, trade and the division of labor ultimately 
result in more stuff for everyone, and cooperation is usually the 
only way to achieve private aims. However, any given bargain 
is inherently competitive: The more you get, even of the gains 
from cooperation, the less I do. An invisible hand may assure 
that my selfishness works to the common good (at least under 
the right conditions), but in the norms of this role, the common 
good, or indeed your personal happiness, is important to me 
only to the extent that it makes me more likely to get what I 
want.  
Even norms as seemingly fundamental to the market as 
honesty are justified only in the self-centered utilitarian 
  
 13 Hobbes, of course, is the locus classicus of the fully self-centered 
psychology. I choose Smith and Locke precisely because these authors have a clearer 
sense of the common good and allow for human sympathy, and yet still model a state of 
nature characterized largely by mutually disinterested (if not necessarily hostile) 
people. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS (Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776); LOCKE, supra note 6. Rawls, for all 
his emphasis on the Kantian view, describes parties behind the veil of ignorance in a 
similar fashion, as disinterested rather than mutually concerned. Respect for others is 
a constraint, not a consequence of love or community. This disinterestedness, which to 
me seems implicit in and necessary to the contract view that individuals join society to 
gain benefits for themselves, is central to Rawls’s description of the original position 
and, therefore, undermines any commitment to treating others as ultimate ends. Were 
the bargaining parties allowed true mutual concern (or even envy, a closely related 
emotion), it seems likely that they would reject the difference principle as insufficiently 
egalitarian. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).  
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calculus of personal interest. Good bargainers never tell the 
whole truth about their intentions or concern themselves with 
the needs or expectations of the other side, except as tools to 
their own ends. The person who spots a value that others have 
missed and takes advantage of it—buying low, selling high—is 
an entrepreneurial hero, not a deceitful cheat.  
The market is a world of symmetrical autonomy. In the 
market, we, or at least our dollars, are all the same in relevant 
part, all equal and all presumed to be able to take care of 
ourselves. Markets presume that their participants are self-
sufficient adults, aware of what they want, able to balance 
their needs, desires and capacities, negotiating in their own 
interest from a position of reasonable independence. Equally 
important, markets price products, not status or person. Equal 
products ought to command equal prices; price discrimination 
is presumptively improper. Money is green regardless of 
pedigree; opportunities should be taken regardless of tradition; 
cooperation is bought and sold. The anonymous stock market—
where buyers and sellers never even learn the other’s 
identity—is the paradigm; the ideal of blind meritocracy its 
extension.14 The market normative system is radically 
disrespectful of persons, status and relationship.  
In the market, obligation stems mainly from contractual 
promise, and extends only so far as the promise did. This is not 
a world of solidarity or natural obligations. Your humanity or 
fellow citizenship has only a limited negative claim on me, that 
I not violate your individuality by violence or fraud, narrowly 
understood. Market participants are free, of course, to care for 
others, but to do so in public is nepotism or favoritism—a 
violation of market norms even when not illegal. In the public 
sphere, if you take the needs of your bargaining counterpart as 
values in themselves rather than tools to be used to overcome 
him, you are either discriminating or just a mark, a fool or a 
sucker. The goal of arms-length bargaining is to get as much as 
you can while giving as little as you can, limited only by the 
rules of the game.  
But if firms hire, fire, buy and sell in the world of the 
market, they produce in a different arena altogether. As Coase 
  
 14 For further discussion, see, Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-
Majoritarian Difficulty: Judicial Decision-Making in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 781, 813-15 (2001) (discussing the difference between market and majoritarian 
decision-making in a democracy). 
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pointed out, were firms just markets, they would not exist.15 
Markets are better at being markets. Firms exist because they 
can do things that markets cannot do well. In particular, they 
replace disinterested contracting with cooperative planning.  
Inside the firm, market norms disappear. Instead, the 
fundamental legal norm governing employees is agency, with 
its strongly asymmetrical fiduciary obligations.  
An agent is required to work for her principal. Instead 
of maximizing what she can get from a stranger (and relying on 
an invisible hand to turn this seemingly selfish behavior into 
something socially useful), she must take the principal’s ends 
as her own. Much as a mother is better off when her child is 
better off (without a contractual expectation of payback) or a 
patriot wins when the nation wins (even if he is killed in the 
process), the norms of agency demand that the employee see 
the employer’s good as her own. She must put aside her self-
interest (in the market, contractual sense) and concern herself 
only with the interests of the other.  
Agency is profoundly opposed to the symmetrical 
anonymity and mutual indifference of market’s strangers. The 
market-contract ideal is of blindness to personal characteristics 
and relationships—a common carrier open to all comers, an 
anonymous stock market, a medieval fair in which ancestral 
enemies meet momentarily to trade, charging the same price to 
lords and peasants alike, or a Weberian bureaucracy promoting 
and deciding on merit alone. In contrast, agents must always 
remember who is who. To her principal, the agent owes a 
fiduciary duty; that duty requires her to work for the principal 
and against (in the market sense) all others. Employees work 
for employers, not the other way around: The principal gives 
orders and the agent takes them; the employee must set aside 
her own interests but the employer need not. Inside the 
organization, you obey or you cooperate; with outsiders you 
compete. Relationships and status are essential. Until you 
know who is agent and who principal, who boss and who 
subordinate, who insider and who outsider, you know nothing 
at all. The market ideals of anonymity, autonomy and equality 
have no place in an agency relationship.  
  
 15 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (1937), reprinted 
in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW (1988) 33-57, and in THE 
NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT (Oliver E. Williamson 
& Sidney G. Winter eds. 1991). 
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This world of agency is defined by group loyalty and 
team spirit. The firm should be a team, with each agent 
working for the good of the whole (otherwise, it is hard to see 
how it could out-compete a market). Instead of the morality of 
independence, equality and autonomy, here we have the 
morality of self-abnegation, sacrifice, caring and unity. We 
work together, to promote our collective good (against the 
others). This is a world not of strangers but of family-like 
groups, in which each person’s actions (and, as Professor 
Darley points out, self-understanding) is interrelated with 
others’.  
We cannot privilege one value system over the other. 
Nor can we live by either alone. Market disinterestedness 
underpins bureaucratic regularity and offers liberation from 
feudal oppression, but threatens to descend into the Hobbesian 
war of all against all exemplified by the free market of post-
communist Moscow or civil war Beirut. Agency status and 
mutual concern is the foundation of patriotism and social 
justice—as well as nationalist riots, mob violence, prejudice 
and group-think. Capitalist affluence and democratic liberal 
freedom alike depend on both existing and each restrained.  
Professor Darley points out the “alternate identities on 
offer” in our business corporations, using the example of 
Michael Lewis’s experiences as a bond trader. Lewis was 
shocked to discover that in his employer’s view, his client was 
the bond desk, not the customer. To modify Professor Darley’s 
terminology slightly, Lewis was confronted with a choice of 
roles and the morals associated with them. According to the 
bond desk culture he confronted, he was a member of a team. 
The team was the company, and the team contended that team 
loyalties trumped legal responsibilities (or alternative views of 
who he should have viewed as his team).  
Note, though, that the issue here is not selfishness or 
greed (at least not Lewis’s). Lewis was being asked to be loyal 
and self-sacrificing–but to the company, not his client. The 
ethical breach was not normlessness, but the wrong norm; not 
selfishness, but the wrong team. The alternative identities 
available include not just the Commedia del’Arte trickster that 
Professor Darley discusses, but the market hard bargainer, the 
capitalist entrepreneur, the team player and the loyal 
professional. 
As Lewis’s story demonstrates, when values slip out of 
their proper spheres or when the spheres overlap, scandal can 
result. In Lewis’s case, the issue was how to define his 
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fiduciary duties: Was he meant to be working for his employer 
or his client, should his loyalty to his (local) teammates trump 
loyalty to his client or the more abstract requirements of law?  
Often, however, the problem is not defining the team or 
limiting its demands. Many corporate problems stem simply 
from the conflict between the fiduciary norms of agency within 
the firm, which demand self-sacrifice in support of the team, 
and the market norms outside it, which demand self-
interestedness. The celebration of unrestrained market in 
American political ideology of the last couple of decades has 
accentuated the conflict. Thus, a CEO who bargains for as 
many stock option grants as he can get or who sells his stock 
when the market is up is acting according to market norms. 
When he announces that the company is doing well when in 
fact it is not, he is bluffing in the way that contractual 
bargainers regularly do. When he fires employees for no reason 
other than maximizing corporate profit, or treats their pensions 
not as a social good but as a cost to be cut in any way legally 
permissible, or encourages his traders to use the rules of a 
semi-deregulated market to generate private profits at the 
expense of the California public, he is acting quite properly if 
the proper norms to follow are those of the disinterested 
market. In a market, strangers may be exploited to the 
maximum extent permitted by law. Indeed, if he cooks the 
company’s books to make it appear to be worth more than it is, 
he may be acting as a faithful agent, putting aside his own 
interests (and integrity) in order to aid the firm and its 
shareholders.16 
In these scandals, the problem is not lawless 
selfishness, corruption or poorly socialized sociopaths. The evil 
is not normlessness but the wrong norm in the wrong place at 
the wrong time. It is a complex problem that will require 
complex analysis and complex solutions. 
V.  MEDIATING THE CONFLICTING NORMS 
Combining Professor Treviño’s contribution with 
Professor Darley’s, we can take the point further. Corporate 
  
 16 The court in Kamin v. American Express accepted precisely this 
explanation of a corporate manager’s decision to account for a transaction in a way that 
cost the company real money but made its profit appear greater, and therefore, if the 
stock market was deceived, would keep its stock price higher. See 383 N.Y.S. 2d 807 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).  
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wrongdoing often results from a conflict of norms, rather than 
a simple refusal to act ethically. In these cases, the problem is 
not “bad apples” rejecting the norms they are expected to apply, 
but institutions imposing inappropriate norms (as in Lewis’s 
case) or a corporate actor making what we—after the fact—
view as inappropriate choices among conflicting normative 
demands each of which requires setting aside the employee’s 
own interests or desires. Importantly, when this happens, 
actors may experience their wrong-doing as self-sacrificing, 
ethical and externally constrained, not as an act of selfish evil 
at all.  
To be sure, sometimes bad apple explanations are 
correct. Employees sometimes place their own self-interest 
above their obligations to others—Bering Bank failed when a 
trader made a bad trade and then covered it up rather than 
admit to his mistake, and many of the top executives who 
falsified their books profited directly from the artificially high 
stock prices resulting from their lies.  
But the articles by Professor Treviño and Professor 
Darley suggest that this type of corruption—variants on 
embezzlement—is not the most useful paradigm for corporate 
wrongdoing. Without ignoring outright criminals, we should 
focus our primary attention on ordinary people caught in a web 
of conflicting norms—norms that are mediated, explained and 
ultimately enforced by corporate structures under the control of 
the CEO.  
The contradictory norms are fundamental. First, we 
operate under a background regime that glorifies self-help, 
even at the expense of others. The basic market norm 
encourages hard bargaining, thinking of yourself and your 
needs without any consideration of others except as tools to 
your own ends: that is what we call arms-length bargaining, 
and success at it is success in the business world. Competing 
hard is a good thing, not a bad one.  
Of course, at the same time that we glorify strong 
competitors, we expect them to observe certain limits. Athletes 
should play fair, not beat up their opponents or take 
performance-enhancing drugs. Businessmen should create 
better products for less, not lie about the product, falsify their 
books, or shake-down competitors. These rules act as 
constraints to a game otherwise structured by a different set of 
norms.  
Predictably, a certain number of people will fail to 
observe the limits, getting so caught up in the game that they 
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forget that winning is not everything. Basketball players foul, 
seemingly patriotic commanders condone or order torture, 
publicists and advertisers spin, and accountants stretch. But 
they do so to benefit the team, not necessarily to benefit 
themselves. Perhaps they are “bad apples” in the sense that 
they have lost their sense of where playing hard meets playing 
fair, but more importantly, they may also be altruistic team 
players—they are cheating for the glory of the team, not 
themselves. Perhaps this is why we often seem so conflicted 
about punishing them.  
Second, corporations create their own internal norms of 
accepted and expected behavior. To be a professional requires, 
in most instances, putting aside your own beliefs and adopting 
the goals of your client. Agency law principles (and their 
ordinary morality equivalents) usually say the same thing for 
employees: An employee, on the job, acts ethically and properly 
if she puts aside her values and adopts her employer’s. Enron 
famously took these potentially conflicting rules to the 
paradoxical extreme, telling its employees that the way to be 
team players—to work for the firm—was to compete as hard 
and ruthlessly as possible—for themselves as individuals.17  
Corporations, like other groups and bureaucracies, can 
be structured to maximize group solidarity or not. In this age of 
the imperial CEO, the corporate world seems especially intent 
on creating solidarity in the work force. Managers train in the 
techniques of creating team spirit, team norms, team ethics 
and team loyalty. Whether by Professor Tom Tyler’s procedural 
justice, tent-revival meeting style hortatory, or simple “us 
against them” competition, well-run firms work to create and 
maintain norms of employee loyalty to the firm.  
Group loyalty has well-known problems—most 
importantly, for our purposes, group-think. Tightly knit groups 
tend to develop their own internal norms, as Professor Darley 
points out, with most group members recreating themselves to 
fit their understanding of the demands of the group. But a 
group that adopts a uniform and closed analysis of the world 
will be poorly equipped to deal with changing external 
challenges. When everyone thinks the same way, no one will 
see the errors in the standard thinking, whether the problem is 
  
 17 Enron was famous for its harsh intra-firm competition, in which employees 
were regularly required to rank each other, with the winners receiving bonuses and 
promotions and the losers being fired. 
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false analysis of the external world (seeing weapons of mass 
destruction where there are none, or not seeing competitive 
threats where they are clear) or normative drift.  
With the collapse of the unions, the main external 
countervailing force to corporate loyalty is the corrosive 
individualism of the market itself. Employees are not only 
members of the team influenced by norms of team spirit and 
mutual responsibility, but also potentially out for themselves in 
a market governed by self-interest. Thus, market norms 
suggest, as the Wall Street Journal’s career management 
column regularly does, that the intelligent employee will 
always focus on creating the appearance of team loyalty 
without succumbing to its reality, and, as Dilbert teaches each 
day, a cynical distrust of anything “the Boss” might say. These 
market norms limit the power of group loyalty and group-
think, but may not do so in particularly useful ways. Cynical 
self-interestedness leads to conformity, not to the sort of brave 
dissent that functional institutions need.  
One aspect of corporate wrongdoing then, is the 
difficulty of mediating fundamentally contradictory norms. We 
demand that corporate agents cause the corporation to compete 
hard, treat the people they contract with at arms length as 
tools to the end of profit, set aside their personal political and 
moral beliefs while on the job in order to do the work they are 
paid for. We demand that employees be team players and make 
clear that the team is the firm, regardless of the needs of the 
greater society. Paradoxically, that is, we demand that 
employees altruistically and selflessly serve—but the cause 
they are to serve is simply the self-interested firm, which is 
free to treat employees as competitive opponents rather than 
teammates. It is not surprising that some fail at this difficult 
game.  
Moreover, one key way in which we identify ethical 
behavior in ourselves and others is self-denial. Kant claimed 
that the highest form of moral behavior is that which does not 
benefit the actor at all. I suspect he was wrong,18 but the kernel 
  
 18 The Kantian formulation, in my view, fails to capture the importance of 
other-directed team behavior, which is deeply satisfying to the actor. Mothers do 
sacrifice for their children as patriots do for their country, but the sacrifice is not the 
essence or the test of the morality of their actions. Rather than sacrificing our own 
good, within a team we treat the other as ourself, the good of any team member as our 
own good. Moreover, emphasizing sacrifice suggests, as I note in the text, that 
selfishness is the main cause of evil, missing the important point that each form of 
good self-sacrifice has an accompanying evil form. People are often happy to sacrifice 
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of truth is clear. The clearest instance of unethical and 
unprofessional behavior is pure self-interested selfishness: 
stealing from the client.  
This agency understanding that the ethical thing to do 
is to set aside your own views and instead adopt the profit-
maximizing norm of the corporation is so strong that it may 
cause decision-makers to act contrary to their views as citizens 
even when profit is not at stake. It is often difficult to tell what 
the right thing to do is and even more often difficult to tell 
what the profitable thing to do is. But the Kantian 
understanding that “morality hurts” allows a quick (if often 
misleading) heuristic. The one time that I know I am acting as 
a good agent, setting aside my own views in the interest of the 
team, is when I do something I know that I (in my citizen role) 
would disapprove of. The easiest way to show that I am acting 
properly is to act improperly. And in the corporate context, this 
means I should do what is profitable, regardless of whether it is 
socially useful.  
Moreover, I believe the heuristic is commonly taken one 
step further. Often I may be unsure whether something is 
profitable, but confident that it is wrong. The agency 
understanding powerfully (if illogically) suggests that I should 
pick the wrong action. Virtue hurts; agents are supposed to set 
aside their own beliefs. By picking something I know I would 
disapprove of in my private role, I know I am acting as an 
agent, even if profit remains elusive.  
It may be hard to prove whether the strictures of the 
corporate social responsibility movement increase or decrease 
long term profit. But it is easy to see that as citizens, we will 
find many of them attractive. Rejecting them, even in the 
absence of any actual evidence regarding their costs or benefits 
to the firm, is an easy and psychologically clear way of proving 
that the decision-maker is acting in role, as a team member. 
Perversely, then, actors attempting to do the right thing (in 
their role as agents) may end up making decisions they know 
are wrong (in their role as citizens) and which do not even 
maximize profit.  
Team players act on behalf of the team, not themselves. 
When the subcontractors described by Professor Darley decided 
to falsify test results, they knew they were risking their 
  
themselves for evil causes, as every student of the virulent forms of nationalism, 
religion, fascism and communism knows.  
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personal careers and freedom. They were setting aside their 
own interests in favor of the interests of a whole greater than 
themselves. Professor Darley describes this as adopting a social 
role and proposes various villains. But in a very simple and 
clearly understandable sense, the role adopted is simply the 
good and loyal team player. This is ethical behavior—self 
sacrifice for a cause. Good employees don’t shirk and they don’t 
tattle either.  
The problem, then, is not (only) bad apples, selfishness 
or insufficiently socialized individuals who do not understand 
how to play fair. It is also morality in the cause of the firm—a 
type of local patriotism. Self-sacrifice in the cause of profit. 
Setting aside your own moral views to do what the job requires, 
distasteful as that may be. Enron’s traders viewed themselves 
as heroes, and on this level they were right: heroes fighting to 
oppress the ratepayers on behalf of the firm and its 
shareholders. 
We have then this paradox. If the purpose of the 
corporation is to make a profit, as many have claimed, then the 
way that an employee fulfills her ethical obligation on the job is 
by promoting the corporation’s profit. But despite Milton 
Friedman’s famous claim that the ethical obligation of business 
is profit, placing profit above all is precisely the definition of 
unethical behavior in the corporate context.19 Ethical behavior 
in the corporate context means understanding that loyalty, 
honesty and relationships with your customers, your suppliers, 
your employers, your country, even the earth itself, are 
sometimes more important than short-term (or even long term) 
profits. Ethical behavior on the individual level means knowing 
when to buck the group norms, when to stand up for one 
normative system in opposition to another, when to violate the 
agency norm of setting aside your own sense of right and wrong 
and to selfishly follow your own lights. On the institutional 
level, ethical behavior requires building in safeguards against 
group-think, limits to the pursuit of short-term profit, 
  
 19 Even Friedman acknowledges that pursuit of profit must be restrained by 
external legal norms of “deception and fraud,” although he does not explain why these 
violations differ from the additional ethical obligations ones he rejects. “There is one 
and only one social responsibility of business—to use it resources and engage in 
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the 
game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or 
fraud.” Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970) (magazine). 
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commitments to particular relationships and focus on products 
and services rather than stock market prices.  
When an entire institution goes bad, it is not the result 
of a “bad apple.” Rather, it is the result of employees or 
corporate agents doing exactly what they think they are 
supposed to do under the circumstances, even when they have 
strong misgivings about whether the actions are proper from a 
societal point of view. As Professor Darley notes, in several of 
the most famous cases of corporate wrongdoing, the employees 
who did the bad acts were perfectly aware that they were 
acting improperly according to social norms, and even worried 
about criminal liability. The point is, however, that as they 
took actions they knew were wrong—falsifying test results, 
falsifying financial data, distorting the California electric 
market to “steal” from Aunt Millie—these employees saw 
themselves as acting properly within their job. Much as 
soldiers learn to kill in the cause of the nation, Enron’s 
employees learned to pillage in the cause of the firm. The moral 
thing to do, at least so long as you have not resigned from your 
job, appeared to be to set aside individual morality and act in 
the interests of the team, to do what was necessary to win.  
Team loyalty and internal corporate norms trumped 
national patriotism and national norms. Indeed, in the end, 
they even trumped profit: Profit, like happiness, is one of those 
things best achieved by aiming elsewhere. The exclusive 
emphasis on short term profit in each of the institutions caught 
up in the great turn of the century scandals is not accidental. 
In the end, a corporation can only out-compete markets by 
being good at things markets are not good at, and the most 
important of those is long term relationships. But short term 
profit demands treating all relationships instrumentally, and 
that, in turn, destroys them, and with them, the basis of future 
profits. Laser-like focus on profits, as Enron demonstrates, is 
fundamentally incompatible with actually earning them.  
The issue, then, is corporate culture, and as Professor 
Treviño has pointed out, corporate culture starts at the top. 
CEOs have enormous influence on the way in which their 
corporations respond to these normative demands, through 
modeling as well as their decisions about how to structure the 
corporation, about what measures of success to emphasize, 
about how and who to promote or not, about how to resolve 
conflicts between the alternative norms and identities “on 
offer.” Even if corporate culture is never entirely under CEO 
control, the contributors to this Symposium make clear that in 
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fact CEOs do matter, that it is not enough to simply dismiss 
them either as rapacious kleptocrats or as absent minders 
unfairly held responsible for the wrongdoings of subordinates.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
From a regulatory perspective, several consequences 
follow from this discussion of normative conflict.  
First, we should not fall into the mistake of thinking 
that the problem is centrally one of sociopaths, or to be dealt 
with by criminal law. Soldiers kill but they are not murderers 
(unless they are soldiers for a particularly evil state). Many of 
our corporate wrongdoers, particularly at the lower levels, are 
not motivated by selfishness but by selflessness. This means 
that obtaining convictions under conventional criminal law is 
going to be difficult: Some of the worst malefactors will be able 
to demonstrate that they were not thinking of themselves as 
they did their destruction. In the manner Hannah Arendt 
called the “banality of evil,” they were good bureaucrats, doing 
their jobs as they understood them, according to the norms of 
the job. Criminal law looks for corruption—self-interest where 
loyalty is required—but the problem here may often be loyalty 
where rebellion was needed.  
Relatedly, and more tentatively, it is time for further 
examination of whether criminal law and regulatory control of 
the corporation ought to focus more on the CEO as an 
individual and less on the firm as a legal person. Currently, the 
corporation itself is often the target of regulatory law: fines are 
imposed on it, injunctions are entered against it, and so on. 
Unfortunately, when firms are penalized, many humans who 
were not in positions of authority are likely to suffer. Thus, for 
example, when Enron went bankrupt due to institutional 
wrongdoing, thousands of lower level employees lost their jobs 
and pensions. Professor Treviño’s research suggests that we 
might do better—causing less disruption to the economy and 
less harm to innocent corporate participants—if regulatory and 
criminal law took more account of the internal workings of 
corporations. If CEOs are important, then we should be able to 
reform corporations by changes at the top before writing off the 
particular corporation as incorrigible.20 To the extent that CEOs 
  
 20 Warren Buffett’s reform of Salomon Brothers following its bond trading 
scandal might be an example. 
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can affect the corporate culture, then they, rather than the 
institution, ought to be held liable for its misdeeds.  
Second, both at the legal level and within the 
organization, we need to think harder about what works and 
what does not.  
Corporate law is silent on ethics. The state law that 
creates our corporations and governs their basic decision-
making processes does not require any consideration of the 
claims of stakeholders, society as a whole or even the real 
human beings who own shares. We rely on the price 
mechanism and external regulation to control our corporations, 
but build nothing into the firms to prevent them from seeking 
to subvert those systems or to induce them to explicitly 
consider any countervailing values.  
For several decades, corporate law scholars, even more 
than the case law, have taught that the only ethical course of 
behavior for a corporation is the unmitigated pursuit of profit. 
This laser-like focus on profit is precisely our problem, not the 
solution.  
Corporate law scholarship can most usefully aid this 
project of creating a more profitable and more committed 
corporate sector by exploring the ways in which the law 
structures our existing markets, to their benefit and detriment, 
rather than by pretending that markets somehow exist 
abstracted from a legal framework. We have no agreement on 
how to resolve the conflicts among our normative systems (and 
perhaps such agreement is impossible). Still, we can have a 
fuller discussion of what it means to be ethical, of when market 
pressures ought to be resisted, of short term and long term 
conflicts, and so on, if we escape the trap of market 
determinism and the unfounded faith that in the end markets 
will automatically take us where we want to go.  
CEOs, it is now clear, are critical. They, along with 
corporate law and both legal and business scholarship, can 
begin to engage the challenge of a richer understanding of 
corporate purpose, or they can insist that the stock ticker must 
rule. They can reinforce the cultural influences suggesting that 
the only proper role of a corporate employee is to help report a 
quarterly profit, or they can counter them. They can treat their 
employees as disposable means to a corporate end, or as the 
corporation itself. They can, by their choices about their own 
compensation, further the cynical view that the corporate world 
is only about getting your own, or they can join the corporate 
team and make it a more genuine enclave in the market.  
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Corporate law itself could start by abandoning the 
internal affairs doctrine, so that a genuine competition between 
the states, seeking to affect market incentives instead of simply 
pandering to them, can develop. Once the larger states begin to 
take responsibility for the governance of their largest economic 
entities, a thicker corporate law might move us in the direction 
of a more functional set of norms, practices and incentives.  
Specifically, corporate law should begin exploring 
mandatory internal compliance mechanisms. Although courts 
eventually concluded that it might be a breach of fiduciary duty 
for a bank to hand cash to tellers with no safeguards, they have 
imposed no parallel requirement that firms have an ethics 
manager. We know that group-think is a problem in all 
bureaucratic organizations. Now legislatures need to consider 
mandating ombudsmen or similar parallel reporting systems to 
lessen the likelihood of group-think and to catch outright 
corruption. Similarly, courts need to consider whether 
corporate law fiduciary norms require more than avoiding 
unprofitable illegality while maximizing profit—whether, 
indeed, it isn’t a corporate law requirement that firms observe 
the spirit and not merely the letter of our other regulatory 
schemes.  
More fundamentally, the profit maximization norm 
itself is dysfunctional even in the narrowest sense. Part of our 
problem is that too close a focus on profit maximization focuses 
firm actors on the wrong parts of our normative systems and, 
in the end, is not profit maximizing at all. While courts 
generally do not require anything resembling a strong version 
of short-term profit-maximization, the market structure in 
which publicly traded corporations operate, and the ethos of 
our business and law schools, often do press managers in that 
direction.  
We need countervailing power structures within the 
corporation. Profit is best pursued indirectly, by commitment to 
the products and services that create demand, together with 
commitments to the relationships that make a corporation a 
viable alternative to markets. Currently, the corporate 
decision-makers—upper management—are answerable to a 
board elected only by shares. The short-termism and narrow 
focus of the stock market become overly influential almost 
automatically as a result. Boards need to have built-in 
pressures to respond to other values and other commitments as 
well, including both representatives of those values and 
interests and answerability to them. 
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We need an external reporting system, modeled after 
successful practices of the airline accident reporting system or 
the CDC’s emerging hospital error reporting systems, to 
generate systematic knowledge about which ethical breaches 
regularly repeat and under what circumstances.  
We need restrictions on corporate interventions in the 
regulatory system. An organization that has as its central 
mission the pursuit of profit restrained only by the limits 
imposed by law will always have a tendency to subvert the 
restrictions on it. Business corporations by their nature need to 
be policed; we need to keep them out of the business of 
eliminating their policemen. 
We need to seek ways to increase team behavior inside 
the corporation: mutual commitment and joint enterprise. This 
is mainly an issue for management and those who educate 
them, rather than the law, but not entirely. The current 
structure of the public corporation invites too close an alliance 
between short-term profit oriented institutional shareholders 
(reflecting the problematic dynamics of any market and our 
particular stock market) and managers bribed and beaten into 
a similar view.21  
We need limits on CEO compensation relative to 
ordinary employees for the simple reason that too big an 
income gap automatically creates distance and the “out of 
touch” CEO identified by Professor Treviño as the source of 
ethics problems and bad business decisions alike. While there 
is strong evidence that in at least some cases CEO 
  
 21 In theory, of course, institutional shareholders, being permanent investors, 
ought to be concerned about the long term prospects of the corporations they invest in, 
and quarterly results should be important only to the extent that they accurately 
predict those. If the newer theories are correct that excessive focus on short-term 
results is bad for long-term results, institutional investors ought to see this and correct 
their behavior. Indeed, the success of Berkshire-Hathaway and the current popularity 
of hedge funds may reflect those investors’ ability to take long term views. But more 
often, institutional investors are structurally incapable of ignoring short-term 
fluctuations. Mutual funds, for example, must respond to the short-term vagaries of 
their own investors. Even institutions with more stable investment pools are typically 
staffed by decision-makers whose careers depend on beating the market every quarter. 
Our longest term investors, therefore, are famous for too often acting as if they were 
the shortest-term ones.  
  Moreover, there is little reason to believe that this market can self-correct. 
It is notoriously difficult to distinguish good investment managers (including in the 
underlying corporations) from poor ones, a problem made more difficult by the end-
game problems posed by the fact that both on Wall Street and in the chief executive 
offices most actors are already contemplating retirement by the time they arrive. Thus, 
high reliance on quarterly results is not obviously irrational from an individual 
perspective even though it is harmful from a social one.  
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compensation has become so large that it materially affects 
corporate profits directly, that problem seems to me less likely 
to demand urgent legal intervention: When the market 
concludes that CEO compensation is hurting the prospects of 
future returns to stock ownership, stock price drops are a fairly 
effective method of enforcing its will.  
And because any reform that empowers employees or 
relationships relative to the stock market will tend to reduce 
the constant revolution of commitment-less capitalism, we need 
to work to lessen some external sources of friction in our 
system. We need to allow our industrial unions to organize by 
industry rather than by plant, so that they can stop being a 
lobbying force for obsolete plants and so that managers do not 
have a constant incentive to churn physical capital simply to 
union bust. We need to separate health and retirement benefits 
from specific firms for exactly the same reason, so that 
employees can change jobs more readily and less traumatically 
and so that employers don’t function under constant stock 
market pressure to find new and creative ways to abandon past 
commitments.  
But most of all, we need to recognize that market 
Darwinism, like the natural kind, can lead to success, to 
extraordinarily strange, creative and unexpected uses of 
existing resources (the panda’s thumb, the bat’s wing), or 
simply to extinction. Fitness in a Darwinian world means only 
that you’ve survived so far. Stock market success comes from 
maximizing stock price, not from maximizing ethics, human 
decency, or even wealth—except to the extent that we can 
figure out how to make stock prices reflect human values. If we 
are to harness the wonderful power of the market to our own 
good—to human values of well-being, justice and the good 
life—we must always remember that the invisible hand is ours, 
and that if it is leading us in directions we don’t like, we can 
redirect it elsewhere. The choice is not between market or law, 
but between legally regulated markets that mandate or 
encourage us to abandon our other commitments and different 
regulation that could better harness the power of the market to 
work for us. We are the masters; the question is how to use our 
mastery.  
 
